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In the midst of a tight labor market and increased inflation, freedom
of movement for employees is a critical right, allowing individuals to
seek out the best employment opportunities. Freedom to change jobs,
without non-compete restrictions, has a positive impact on innovation
and technological progress, enabling the best and brightest minds to
migrate to the most innovative employers paying the best wages and
offering respectful treatment in the workplace. Concomitantly,
employers may view such freedom of employee movement as a negative,
due to a perception that the law results in increased turnover and hiring
costs, as well as a risk to trade secret protection.
California’s Business and Professions Code (“BPC”) section
16600 guarantees the right of employees to be free of non-competition
restrictions, thereby granting the ability to work for competitors or start
a competing business. A remnant of careless judicial dictum from the
California Supreme Court, over a half century old, refers to a
non-existent “trade secret exception” to California’s statutory ban on
non-competition agreements. This Article analyzes and demonstrates
that there is not a trade secret exception to BPC section 16600.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California law protects employees from being subjected to
non-competition clauses or agreements in the workplace.1 As a result,
California employees are free to change jobs and work for competitors.2
California’s Business and Professions Code (“BPC”) section 16600
creates this right and simply states: “Except as provided in this chapter,
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”3

1. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.); see also Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008) (“The law
protects Californians and ensures ‘that every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any lawful
employment and enterprise of their choice.’ It protects ‘the important legal right of persons to
engage in businesses and occupations of their choosing.’ ” (citation omitted)) . See generally
Bradford P. Anderson, Complete Harmony or Mere Detente? Shielding California Employees
from Non-Competition Covenants, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 8, 9 (2007) (noting that the
language of the statute prohibits one from being “restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind . . . .”).
2. See Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 517 (Cal. 2004) (“[I]t has long been the public
policy of our state that ‘[a] former employee has the right to engage in a competitive business
for himself and to enter into competition with his former employer . . . provided such
competition is fairly and legally conducted.’ ” (quoting Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v.
Moseley, 24 Cal.2d 104, 110 (1944)).
3. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
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In the midst of a tight labor market4 and increased inflation,5
freedom of movement for employees is a critical right, allowing for
individuals to seek out the best employment opportunities. BPC section
16600 provides employees freedom to move and change jobs, assuring
that income will not become stagnated due to the inability to search for,
and accept, a job with a new employer.6 This is especially important in
the event of job termination by an employer, where a non-compete could
force the former employee to turn to public assistance, due to the
inability to obtain alternative employment. Freedom to change jobs,
without non-competition restrictions, has a positive impact on
innovation and technological progress,7 enabling the best and brightest
minds to migrate to pioneering employers paying the best wages and
offering respectful treatment in the workplace. However, employers
may view BPC section 16600 negatively due to a perception that the law

4. See Tim Smart, Overwhelming Majority of Businesses Report Difficulty Hiring
Workers and Retaining Existing Employees, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 2, 2021, 12:57
PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2021-06-02/overwhelmingmajority-of-businesses-report-difficulty-hiring-workers-and-retaining-existing-employees;
Julia Cooper, Then and now: How San Francisco’s largest tech employers have changed, S.F.
BUS. TIMES, (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2021/08/27/
san-francisco-crm-goog-twit-uber-abnb.html (“Prior to the pandemic one of the top
complaints from tech companies was the competition for talent. Has the past 15 months
changed anything from a talent retention/recruiting standpoint? We asked companies
responding to our SFBT tech employers survey what they think. ‘No, if anything it’s become
more competitive because we’re not just competing with local companies (including industry
giants with deep pockets), but we’re now competing with companies all over the country with
more flexible remote work policies.’ - Claire Baker, chief of staff, Render Services Inc.”);
DEALBOOK NEWSL., Why It’s Hard to Hire Right Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/business/dealbook/labor-shortage-causes.html;
Difficulty hiring and keeping workers will last into 2022, Willis Towers Watson survey finds,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Aug. 25, 2021, 9:09 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2021/08/25/2286407/0/en/Difficulty-hiring-and-keeping-workers-will-last-into2022-Willis-Towers-Watson-survey-finds.html.
5. See Gwynn Guilford, Broader Inflation Pressures Begin to Show, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
4, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/broader-inflation-pressures-begin-to-show11633339800; Stephanie Landsman, Market is unprepared for the inflation fallout, Wharton’s
Jeremy Siegel warns, CNBC (Oct. 3, 2021, 5:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2021/10/03/market-is-unprepared-for-inflation-fallout-whartons-jeremy-siegel.html.
6. See Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, 119 MICH. L. REV. 651, 654 (2021) (“And
lax enforcement has enabled employers to engage in a range of conduct that suppresses worker
pay, such as . . . imposing restrictive noncompete provisions in employment contracts.”); see
also Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 162
(2005); Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies,
108 YALE L.J. 967, 989 (1999) (“[F]ull-time work is both necessary and sufficient as a
condition for a decent level of subsistence.”).
7. Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of PostEmployment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 407-08 (2002).
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results in increased turnover and hiring costs,8 as well as a risk to trade
secret protection.9
The protection under BPC section 16600 can get shaded by a
penumbra of an antagonist that really should not exist. A remnant of
judicial dictum10 from the California Supreme Court,11 over a half
century old,12 must be put in its proper place, so that California’s clear
statutory prohibition on non-compete restrictions may continue to
operate as intended by the legislature, and protect the economic viability,
as well as job portability, for every employee and employer in California.
This Article analyzes and demonstrates that there is not a trade secret
exception to BPC section 16600.
In the current market environment where employers are
encountering severe challenges in hiring and retaining employees,13
unscrupulous employers might find it ever so tempting to tug upon any
thread, in the form of dictum, in an effort to unravel the employee
protections of BPC section 16600. The resultant goal, and effect, would
be to effectively restrain employees from moving on to other employers
and opportunities, as well as depress wages.14
II. CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S NON-COMPETE LAW
BPC section 16600 is short, simple, succinct, and downright
eloquent: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or

8. See Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a Category of
Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 83 (2011) (“Judge Posner
has argued that ‘If covenants not to compete are forbidden, the employer will pay a lower
wage, in effect charging the employee for the training.’ ” ); see also Rachel S. ArnowRichman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1204 (2001)
(“To combat this cycle, employers may turn to noncompetes as a vehicle for protecting
financial investments in their workers. . . . [T]he employer overpays the employee at the outset
of the relationship, anticipating that it will recoup its loss by paying the employee less than
his or her true worth for a period after training is provided.” (footnotes omitted)).
9. See generally Viva R. Moffat, Human Capital as Intellectual Property? NonCompetes and the Limits of IP Protection, 50 AKRON L. REV. 903 (2016); Alan Bush &
Morgan Culbreth, Trade Secrets: Security for Soft IP, 31 CORP. COUNS. REV. 97 (2012); John
Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49 (2002); Yochai Benkler,
Law, Innovation, and Collaboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 231 (2017).
10. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
11. See Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147 (Cal. 1965).
12. See id.
13. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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business of any kind is to that extent void.”15 BPC section 16600 has a
genesis dating back to 1872, when California Civil Code section 167316
was enacted to prevent anti-competitive arrangements.17 This protection
also prevents restraints, in the form of non-competition provisions, from
being imposed by employers against former employees.18 BPC section
16600 has a lengthy history enabling an employee to leave one employer
for another, even if the new employer is a competitor.19
A concomitant interest of employers is to protect trade secrets.
Under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CALUTSA),20 a trade
secret is information that “[d]erives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other
persons,”21 and which is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its
secrecy.22
In order to obtain protection under the CALUTSA, reasonable
efforts to maintain secrecy customarily consist of a confidentiality (or
non-disclosure/non-use) agreement between the employer and
employee, typically signed at the beginning of employment.23 In the
15. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
16. See Tait Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: A Proposal for
Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 6-7 (2006) (“What is now section
16600 was enacted in 1872, and the earliest cases construing the statute addressed
anticompetitive arrangements between businesses. By the 1930s, however, courts began using
the statute to void employment agreements and similar contracts that sought to penalize
former employees for using nonsecret information, engaging in competitive business, or both.
Many such decisions described a strong public policy favoring employee mobility. Federal
courts applying California law have also used section 16600 to void restrictive postemployment covenants. Although the outer bounds of the statute have been subject to a host
of inconsistent decisions, courts have repeatedly used the statute to announce a public policy
favoring employee mobility.” (footnotes omitted)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 517 (Cal. 2004) (“[I]t has long been the public
policy of our state that ‘[a] former employee has the right to engage in a competitive business
for himself and to enter into competition with his former employer . . . provided such
competition is fairly and legally conducted.’ ” (quoting Cont’l Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley,
148 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal. 1944)).
20. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426 – 3426.11 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
22. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
23. See generally Byron F. Egan, Confidentiality Agreements: How to Draft Them and
What They Restrict, 33 CORP. COUNS. REV. 35 (May 2014); John F. Hilson & Stephen L.
Sepinuck, A Lesson on Drafting Overly Broad Nondisclosure Agreements, 10
TRANSACTIONAL LAW. 1 (2020); Alec Hillbo, Fifty Years of Restrictive Covenants in Arizona
Law, 4 PHX L. REV. 725 (2011); DLA PIPER, STARTUP PACK NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
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event that an employee violates the sanctity of confidentiality/non-use
of a trade secret, the CALUTSA allows for monetary damages,24 as well
as injunctions for actual or threatened misappropriation of the trade
secret.25 The threat of damages, as well as injunctive relief, not only
applies to the employee or former employee but also applies to others,
such as new (or prospective) employers.26 Injunctions under CALUTSA

(2015),
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2015/03/
startup_pack_nondisclosure_agreement.pdf; N.Y.C BAR ASS’N, MODEL FORM OF NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (2015), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/New_York_City_Bar_
Association_Model_Form_of_Non-Disclosure_Agreement_2015.pdf; CORNELL UNIV.
RESEARCH, NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (2020), https://researchservices.cornell.edu/
sites/default/files/2019-06/Cornell%20Standard%20Bilateral%20NDA%202019%20%20fillable%20form_0.pdf.
24. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.):
(a) A complainant may recover damages for the actual loss caused by
misappropriation. A complainant also may recover for the unjust enrichment caused
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing damages for actual
loss.
(b) If neither damages nor unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation are
provable, the court may order payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than
the period of time the use could have been prohibited.
(c) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary
damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subdivision (a)
or (b).
25. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.):
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the
court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist,
but the injunction may be continued for an additional period of time in order to
eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the
misappropriation.
(b) If the court determines that it would be unreasonable to prohibit future use, an
injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no
longer than the period of time the use could have been prohibited.
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be
compelled by court order.
26. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.):
(b) ‘Misappropriation’ means:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent
by a person who:
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his or her
knowledge of the trade secret was:
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire
it;
(ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or
(iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
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are limited to actual or threatened misappropriation27 of the trade secret,
which means acquisition, disclosure, or use of the underlying trade
secret.
The origins of BPC section 16600 predate CALUTSA by 113
years.28 Nowhere in CALUTSA is there any language allowing it to
supersede the protection of other laws, such as BPC section 16600.29
Moreover, the express language of CALUTSA limits an injunction to
prevent acquisition, disclosure, or use of the trade secret,30 and does not
contain any enabling language allowing non-competition agreements or
other restraints which would interfere with a business, trade, or
profession. However, as explored below, a little dictum from a judicial
opinion over a half century old31 has created a mythical and pernicious
creature, and this figment has received the moniker of the “trade secret
exception” to BPC section 16600.32
III. WHAT IS DICTUM?
Obiter dictum, often shortened to dictum,33 has its origins in Latin,
meaning “something said in passing,”34 and refers to a “judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential
. . . .”35 Dicta is the plural of dictum.36 “In every case, it is necessary to
read the language of an opinion in light of its facts and the issues raised,
in order to determine which statements of law were necessary to the
decision, and therefore binding precedent, and which were general
observations unnecessary to the decision. The latter are dicta, with no
force as precedent.”37
(C) Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that
it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.
27. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.). The origins of BPC section 16600 date back to 1872, and
the original CALUTSA legislation was adopted in 1984, taking effect in 1985.
29. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426 – 3426.11 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
30. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
31. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147 (Cal. 1965).
32. Id.
33. Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
34. Id.
35. Although not precedential, “it may be considered persuasive.” Id.
36. Id.
37. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 309 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998); cf. Appel v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(“Although dicta does not ‘possess the force of a square holding[, it] may nevertheless be
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In contrast to dicta:
The ratio decidendi [holding of a case] is the principle or rule which
constitutes the ground of a decision, and it is this principle or rule
which has the effect of precedent. It is therefore necessary to read
the language of the opinion in light of its facts and the issues raised,
to determine (a) which statements of law were necessary to the
decision, and therefore binding precedents, and (b) which were
arguments and general observations, unnecessary to the decision,
i.e., dicta, with no force as precedents.38

Unfortunately, judicial opinions peppered with dictum can have
devastating consequences by inviting invasion into territory that the
court never intended or envisioned, or sometimes intentionally creating
controversy surrounding the underlying precedent.39
IV. BIGFOOT, THE LOCH NESS MONSTER, AND THE MYTHICAL “TRADE
SECRET EXCEPTION”
The origins of the (non-existent) trade secret exception to BPC
section 16600, in the form of dictum, trace directly back to Muggill v.
Donnelley Corp.,40 where the California Supreme Court decided a case
involving a retirement plan. An employee of Donnelley Corp. met all of
the requirements to qualify for its retirement plan.41 After qualifying for
a pension under the retirement plan, the employee left Donnelly Corp.
and subsequently commenced working for a competitor.42 The
retirement committee of Donnelly Corp. subsequently notified the
former employee that his right to receive payments under the retirement
plan had been terminated, pursuant to a provision in the plan based “on
considered highly persuasive, particularly . . . when made . . . in the course of an elaborate
review of the authorities,’ ‘where it demonstrates a thorough analysis of the issue’ or ‘when
it has been long followed.’ ” (citations omitted)).
38. Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 47 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (citing 9 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, APPEAL § 783, at 753 (3d ed. 1985)).
39. See generally Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161
(2011).
40. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147 (Cal. 1965); cf. David L.
Simson, Customers, Co-Workers and Competition: Employee Covenants in California After
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 239, 247 (2012) (“In 1913 the
California Supreme Court noted that preventing ‘unwarranted disclosure and unconscionable
use of trade secrets’ (i.e., misappropriation) was so fundamental a part of every business
relationship that no contract was required to prohibit it. The corollary to this is that misusing
or misappropriating trade secrets cannot somehow become lawful simply because a contract
not to do so is unenforceable. Stated in the language of section 16600, misusing trade secrets
would not be lawfully engaging in one’s profession, trade or business; therefore a contract to
that effect is valid.” (footnote omitted)).
41. Muggill, 398 P.2d at 148.
42. Id.
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the ground that he had entered the employ of a competitor.”43 The
former employee sued Donnelly Corp., the retirement committee, and
trustee responsible for disbursing funds of the retirement plan.44 At trial,
the court determined that the retirement plan provision was valid and
enforceable, terminating the former employee’s rights to receive income
under the plan by virtue of going to work for a competitor.45
Upon deciding the appeal in Muggill, the California Supreme Court
determined that a “penalty” indeed violates BPC section 16600, and
therefore is unenforceable.46 The Court ruled that the pension plan
provision forfeiting the former employee’s pension rights if he works for
another employer were void and unenforceable, thereby reinstating his
pension rights.47 The court elaborated that:
[S]ection 16600 of the Business and Professions Code provides that
“every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.” . . . Since the pension plan becomes part of the contract of
employment, such provisions therein are also invalid.48

The court referenced an underlying precedent where it had
invalidated a contract forcing a retired employee “to pay liquidated
damages . . . if the employee worked for a competitor.”49 The court
reasoned that such an agreement, imposing a liability of $5,000 for
violation of the contract, prevented the employee from having the
freedom guaranteed by BPC section 16600.50 “To the extent that the
necessity of $5,000 paying deters him from engaging therein, he would
be restrained.”51 Following that reasoning, the court in Muggill ruled
that “the provision forfeiting plaintiff’s pension rights if he works for a
competitor restrains him from engaging in a lawful business and is
therefore void.”52
Unfortunately, in the Muggill opinion, the Court included not only
dictum (something irrelevant to the case under consideration), but also a
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (“The [trial] court also held that the members of the retirement committee and the
trustee were indispensable parties over whom it had no jurisdiction. It therefore entered
judgment for the defendant.”). Upon appeal at the California Supreme Court, the Court
determined, contrary to the finding by the trial court, that the retirement committee and the
trustee were not indispensable parties. Id. at 149 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 149.
47. Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 148.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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flat-out incorrect citation to a legal proposition in a prior case. The gross
misstep in Muggill consists of the following statement: “This section
[BPC § 16600] invalidates provisions in employment contracts
prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor after completion
of his employment or imposing a penalty if he does so unless they are
necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets.”53
The language quoted above constitutes dictum and has no
precedential value.54 Why is it dictum? The Muggill case did not involve
any facts or allegations related to the actual or threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets,55 and aside from exploration of
53. Muggill, 398 P.2d at 148 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see, e.g., id. at 149
(finding that section 16600 permits non-compete provisions in employment contracts when
‘necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets’). See generally Latona v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (The court erroneously
characterized the comment in Muggill to constitute part of the ruling, rather than mere dictum,
stating: “Employment restrictions that serve to protect a former employer’s trade secrets,
proprietary information, and confidential information are valid in California.”).
54. See generally Fairbanks v. Superior Court, 205 P.3d 201, 203 (Cal. 2009) (“Because
the issue was not presented there, that statement was dictum.”); Stockton Theatres, Inc. v.
Palermo, 304 P.2d 7, 9 (1956) (“The discussion or determination of a point not necessary to
the disposition of a question that is decisive of the appeal is generally regarded as obiter
dictum and not as the law of the case.”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 308-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“The court’s passing reference to ‘general
principles of equitable subrogation’ was therefore dicta. This court is in the concededly
delicate position of disagreeing with the specific language of an opinion of our own Supreme
Court. We acknowledge, as we must, that we are bound to follow binding precedent of a
higher court, and that the refusal to do so is in excess of our own jurisdiction. However, we
are not bound by dicta, particularly where it is unpersuasive and contrary to the overwhelming
weight of precedent. In every case, it is necessary to read the language of an opinion in light
of its facts and the issues raised, in order to determine which statements of law were necessary
to the decision, and therefore binding precedent, and which were general observations
unnecessary to the decision. The latter are dicta, with no force as precedent. For the reasons
discussed, we conclude the Supreme Court’s use of the term ‘equitable subrogation’ . . . was
unnecessary to the decision in that case. It is therefore not binding as precedent on this court.”
(citations omitted)).
55. See Muggill, 398 P.2d at 147-49. Although Muggill and Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d
456 (Cal. 1958) (cited in for the erroneous proposition of a trade secret exception to BPC
16600) were both decided prior to California’s adoption of the UTSA, trade secret protection
already existed under applicable law at the time. See Graves, supra note 16, at 41-45
(footnotes and headings omitted):
Over time, California courts during the pre-UTSA period up to 1985 used a variety
of different labels for the same types of claims. Decisions might speak of a “breach
of trust” or “unfair competition” to refer to the same conduct, and they quite often
used the phrases “trade secret” and “confidential information” in the same sentence,
without indicating that there was any legal distinction between them. And then as
now, plaintiffs sometimes sought to proceed under a list of repetitive causes of
action based on the same predicate factual allegations.
....
This is not to suggest that California law has been uniform. There are a few
decisions with unclear holdings, questionable dicta, and, in a few cases, rulings that
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indispensable parties to litigation,56 Muggill was exclusively about a
punitive provision within a retirement plan document which sought to
deprive former employees of a pension57 should such persons
subsequently elect to work for a competitor.58 There was no issue related
to trade secrets in Muggill; therefore, the language in Muggill regarding
a trade secret exception to BPC section 16600 is pure dictum. Most
importantly, the dictum in Muggill is blatantly incorrect in summarizing
the underlying proposition in Gordon v. Landau.59
The flawed dictum from the Muggill court,60 purportedly founded
upon the decision in Gordon, has no basis whatsoever, as Gordon is
devoid of any scintilla of a trade secret exception. The Gordon opinion
neither supports the proposition that restraints against subsequent
employment are permissible if they are necessary to protect the
employer’s trade secrets, nor creates any trade secret exception to BPC
16600.61 Gordon62 exclusively stands for the proposition that a former
employee can be enjoined from using confidential customer lists of a
former employer. Gordon does not opine, or even hint, that a former
employee can be enjoined from working for a competitor, starting a
competing business, or independently developing customer lists that do
are inconsistent with the majority. We will analyze these cases below to find out
whether they offer any alternative theories that could survive UTSA preemption.
The first published California trade secret case dates from 1915, about a century
after the concept developed in England and in the Eastern industrial states. In the
early decades, virtually every California case was a request for an injunction based
on an alleged misuse of a secret customer list, without a specified cause of action.
It is often unclear from such decisions whether the claim was based on tort or
contract principles—because the former employee defendants often had
confidentiality contracts with the plaintiff former employer—or both. The
consistent theme among the cases that reached the merits of whether the information
was truly secret is that the dispositive question is whether the trade or public knew
the information. All of this was also true for pre-UTSA federal trade secret cases
applying California law. Many of the early cases used the phrases “trade secret” and
“confidential” interchangeably, or together as one phrase, with no apparent
distinction between them.
56. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
57. Muggill, 398 P.2d at 148.
58. Id.
59. Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456, 459 (Cal. 1958) (finding a confidentiality
agreement did not violate BPC section 16600 where defendant could carry on any business,
including a directly competing business, after leaving the employer, and was only restricted
from using plaintiff’s confidential customer lists for a period of one year following
termination of defendant’s employment).
60. “This section [BPC 16600] invalidates provisions in employment contracts
prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor after completion of his employment
or imposing a penalty if he does so unless they are necessary to protect the employer’s trade
secrets.” Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149 (citations omitted).
61. Gordon, 321 P.2d at 456-59.
62. Id. at 456.
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not involve use of or reliance upon the confidential information of the
former employer. In Gordon,63 the employee signed a contract agreeing
to the following terms:
8. Collector-Salesman further agrees that during the period of one
(1) year immediately after the termination of his employment with
the Employer he will not, either directly or indirectly, make known
or divulge the names or addresses of any of the customers or patrons
of Employer at the time he entered the employ of Employer or with
whom he became acquainted after entering the employ of Employer,
to any person, firm or corporation, and that he will not, directly or
indirectly, either for himself or for any other person, firm, company
or corporation, call upon, solicit, divert, or take away, or attempt to
solicit, divert or take away any of the customers, business or patrons,
of the Employer upon whom he called or whom he solicited or to
whom he catered or with whom he became acquainted, or upon
whom he called or to whom he catered after his employment with
said Employer.64

After leaving the employer, the subject employee engaged in a
similar business with similar merchandise, and “went along his old route
and methodically visited the customers of plaintiffs whose names,
identities and locations he had learned and whose acquaintances he had
made during and by reason of his former employment . . . .”65
The California Supreme Court ruled that the misappropriation of
trade secrets, consisting of the former employee’s use of confidential
customer lists, justified an injunction prohibiting use of those trade
secrets, as well as money damages.66 However, the California Supreme
Court did not prohibit the former employee from engaging in a
competitive business or developing his own customer lists. The Court
stated:
It clearly appears from the terms of the contract that it did not prevent
defendant from carrying on a weekly credit business or any other
63. Id.
64. Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 459. The court noted that, “[h]e merely agreed not to use plaintiffs’ confidential
lists to solicit customers for himself for a period of one year following termination of his
employment. Such an agreement is valid and enforceable.” Gordon, 321 P.2d at 459. An
injunction, suitable to cover the one year time frame in the event of violation, would therefore
be permissible, but the court went on to add that, “[i]n view of the fact that more than a year
has passed since defendant left plaintiffs’ employ, by the very terms of the contract the time
has elapsed during which plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain an injunction against defendant
restraining him from using the lists of their customers.” Id. As a result, an injunction did not
issue, but the court allowed recovery of damages, stating that “[p]laintiffs were therefore
entitled to have damages found and assessed in their favor. They may recover for all damages
proximately caused by defendant’s wrong.” Id.
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business. He merely agreed not to use plaintiffs’ confidential lists to
solicit customers for himself for a period of one year following
termination of his employment . . . .
The uncontradicted evidence shows that defendant sold goods to at
least 117 of plaintiffs’ preferred customers and in doing so used
plaintiffs’ lists entrusted to him while he was in their employ . . . . It
thus logically follows that a list of such customers is a valuable trade
secret and that plaintiffs were damaged by defendant’s unlawful use
thereof.67

The court in Gordon carefully expressed its opinion and created the
underlying precedent, stating that the contract (as well as the Court’s
order) did not prevent the defendant from carrying on a competitive
business.68 The determinant criterion in Gordon was that the former
employee was using “plaintiffs’ lists entrusted to him while he was in
their employ”69 and, for this reason alone, an injunction against such use
was authorized. The former employee’s use of the proprietary customer
lists to approach at least 117 preferred customers of his former employer
was the touchstone.70 If the former employee would not have used the
proprietary information consisting of these customer lists, he would not
have run amuck of his contract and trade secret obligations to the former
employer. The Gordon court’s ruling did not impair the former
employee’s right to work for a competitor, or to start a competing
business, and did not create a trade secret exception to BPC section
16600. The precedent established in Gordon was simply that the former
employee could not use the proprietary customer lists.
The court covertly and patently stated: “It clearly appears from the
terms of the contract that it did not prevent defendant from carrying on
a weekly credit business or any other business. He merely agreed not to
use plaintiffs’ confidential lists to solicit customers . . . .”71
Undoubtedly, the California Supreme Court constructed this language to
harmonize the respective rights of the parties and to prevent employers
from taking the position that employees cannot engage in a competitive

67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. (“It clearly appears from the terms of the contract that it did not prevent defendant
from carrying on a weekly credit business or any other business. He merely agreed not to use
plaintiffs’ confidential lists to solicit customers for himself for a period of one year following
termination of his employment.”) (emphasis added).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Gordon, 321 P.2d at 459 (“The uncontradicted evidence shows that defendant sold
goods to at least 117 of plaintiffs’ preferred customers and in doing so used plaintiffs’ lists
entrusted to him while he was in their employ.”)
71. Id. (emphasis added).
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business, or that employees must erase all professional growth that they
gained simply from work experience.72
The dictum in Muggill does not purport to overrule, yet alone
address, the carefully drafted language of Gordon. Those relying upon
the dictum in Muggill are engaging in a careless, and incorrect,
characterization of the court’s opinion in Gordon.73 In drafting the
Muggill opinion, the California Supreme Court merely signaled readers
to refer to Gordon for the separate topic of trade secret protection in
prohibiting use of customer lists, and did not create any sort of exception
to BPC section 16600. The topic was all so clearly stated within Gordon;
hence the reference by the Muggill court to Gordon.
V. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO BPC SECTION 16600 ARE IN THE
STATUTE; THERE IS NO TRADE SECRET EXCEPTION
The California Legislature enacted three statutory exceptions that
allow for non-competition covenants in California. These statutory
exceptions consist exclusively of BPC sections 16601, 16602, and
16602.5, and establish that non-competition agreements, under
specifically delineated circumstances, are permissible in the sale of a
business.74
Several statutory exceptions to Section 16600 exist. Sections 16601
and 16602 (derived from Civ. Code, §§ 1674 & 1675) “permit broad
covenants not to compete in two narrow situations, i.e., where a
person sells the goodwill of a business and where a partner agrees
not to compete in anticipation of dissolution of a partnership.”
Section 16601 protects the purchaser of a business from subsequent
competition from the seller, which would reduce the value of the
property right acquired. Section 16602 protects partners from, inter
alia, the risk that a partnership’s goodwill will be diminished by
competition from a withdrawing partner. Section 16602.5, enacted
in 1994, provides that a member of a limited liability company may,

72. See generally Kurt M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study,
42 CAL. W.L. REV. 209, 222-23 (2006) (“A trade secret does not vest in its owner a right of
exclusivity. Others are free to arrive at precisely the same information through independent
creation or discovery and to use it so long as they obtain their knowledge through their own
independent efforts. Therefore, a person who independently invents or discovers information
identical to another’s trade secret, without relying on improper means to do so, is not liable
for misappropriation.” (footnotes omitted)).
73. See supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text.
74. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of
2022 Reg. Sess.).
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upon or in anticipation of dissolution of the company, agree not to
carry on a similar business within a specified geographic area.75

Statutory interpretation dictates that a carefully delineated statute,
with clear exceptions, embodies the entire scope of any such exceptions:
Further, “the presence of express exceptions ordinarily implies that
additional exceptions are not contemplated. ‘[W]here exceptions to
a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be
implied or presumed’ unless a contrary legislative intent is
evident.’ ” 76

Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP77 contains the most significant
analysis by the California Supreme Court in recent era of BPC section
16600 in the employment context. In Edwards, the California Supreme
Court evaluated an employer’s claim, and a line of faulty judicial
opinions, regarding a purported “narrow restraint” exception to BPC
section 16600.78 Namely, the case involved a restraint upon a former
employee where he was prohibited from performing professional
services for any client of his former employer for whom he had
performed services, with such restriction encompassing a period of
eighteen months following the termination or resignation of the
employee.79 In a previous publication written before the California
Supreme Court issued the Edwards decision, the author of this article
characterized the purported “narrow restraint” exception as tantamount
to a faulty declaration that “[a] little bit of violating the law is okay.”80

75. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 795-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008); see also S. Bay Radiology Med. Assocs.
v. Asher, 269 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“Covenants not to compete in contracts
for the sale of a business have also been permitted since enactment of the Civil Code.”).
76. Edwards, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 801.
77. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 288. (“In January 1997, Raymond Edwards II (Edwards), a certified public
accountant, was hired as a tax manager by the Los Angeles office of the accounting firm
Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). Andersen’s employment offer was made contingent upon
Edwards’s signing a noncompetition agreement, which prohibited him from working for or
soliciting certain Andersen clients for limited periods following his termination. The
agreement was required of all managers and read in relevant part: ‘If you leave the Firm, for
eighteen months after release or resignation, you agree not to perform professional services
of the type you provided for any client on which you worked during the eighteen months prior
to release or resignation. This does not prohibit you from accepting employment with a client.
For twelve months after you leave the Firm, you agree not to solicit (to perform professional
services of the type you provided) any client of the office(s) to which you were assigned
during the eighteen months preceding release or resignation. You agree not to solicit away
from the Firm any of its professional personnel for eighteen months after release or
resignation.’ Edwards signed the agreement.”).
80. Anderson, supra note 1, at 27.
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In Edwards, not only did the California Supreme Court
unanimously make an explicit, crystal-clear rejection of any
“narrow-restraint” exception to California’s prohibition against
noncompetition agreements81 under BPC section 16600, but the court
also declared that “Noncompetition agreements are invalid under section
16600 in California even if narrowly drawn, unless they fall within the
applicable statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5.”82
[W]e are of the view that California courts ‘have been clear in their
expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the
state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat.’ Section 16600 is
unambiguous, and if the Legislature intended the statute to apply
only to restraints that were unreasonable or overbroad, it could have
included language to that effect. We reject Andersen’s contention
that we should adopt a narrow-restraint exception to section 16600
and leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, either to relax the
statutory restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the
prohibition-against-restraint rule under section 16600.83

In a footnote (and not in the text of the opinion), the court stated,
“We do not here address the applicability of the so-called trade secret
exception to section 16600 . . . .”84 Why did the court relegate this topic
to a footnote? Clearly this was done as part of prudent judicial restraint,
because the topic of a trade secret exception did not arise in Edwards,
and therefore issuing a determination on the topic would have, in any
event, constituted dictum.
Why is the Edwards footnote regarding the “so-called trade secret
exception” of any relevance? And isn’t the Edwards footnote simply
dictum, as Edwards did not involve allegations of a trade secret
exception?85 Yes, the footnote referring to a “so-called trade
exception”86 in Edwards is technically dictum, but the ratio decidendi87
of the unanimous ruling in Edwards provides a crystal-clear judicial
signal against any “trade secret exception” as the court ordered:

81. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 292-93.
82. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).
84. Id. at 291 n.4.
85. See Power Integrations, Inc. v. De Lara, No. 20-cv-410-MMA (MSB), 2020 WL
1467406, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (“However, because Edwards’ did not involve the
‘so called trade secret exception,’ its statements regarding the existence or the applicability of
a trade secret exception is dicta. Additionally, Edwards noted that ‘[w]e conclude that section
16600 prohibits employee noncompetition agreements unless the agreement falls within a
statutory exception.’ ” )
86. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 291 n.4.
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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(1) To avoid committing dilution of BPC section 16600 by judicial
fiat;88
(2) To use only the exclusive and exhaustive list of statutory
exceptions impacting BPC section 16600;89
(3) To the fact that the entire court defers to the legislature to adopt
additional exceptions to BPC section 16600.90
On the topic of the dictum in the footnote, the terminology used by
the Edwards court referring to a “so-called” trade secret exception
indicates disdain towards the existence of any such concept. The phrase
“so-called” is “used to express one’s view that a name or term is
inappropriate”91 or “used to show that you think a word that is used to
describe someone or something is not suitable or not correct.”92 An
alternative meaning of “so-called” is to “introduce a new word or phrase
that is not yet known . . . .”93 As the mythical concept had been
conceived from careless dictum since 1965 (forty-three and a half years
old at the time of the Edwards opinion), the court’s use of “so-called”
was clearly not to introduce a new phrase, but to signal derision towards
any such beast. “Judges across all courts do not like to be reversed, and
statements of higher courts, even those made in dicta, are excellent
indicators of how a higher court views an issue.”94
The Edwards court could not have been clearer in signaling that the
highest court in the land (as to state law) does not support judicial fiat in
the form of carve-outs or exceptions to BPC section 16600. Who could
mistake this as anything other than a death knell to the so called “trade
secret” exception?

88. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 293.
89. Id. at 290-91 (“Section 16600 states: ‘Except as provided in this chapter, every
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business
of any kind is to that extent void.’ The chapter excepts noncompetition agreements in the sale
or dissolution of corporations (§ 16601), partnerships (ibid.; § 16602), and limited liability
corporations (§ 16602.5).”).
90. Id. at 293 (“We reject Andersen’s contention that we should adopt a narrow-restraint
exception to section 16600 and leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, either to relax the
statutory restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the prohibition-against-restraint rule
under section 16600.”).
91. Meaning
of
“so-called”
from
Oxford
Languages,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?q=so-called+meaning (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
92. So-called,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/so-called (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
93. Id.
94. McAllister, supra note 39, at 178-79.
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VI. THE THREAT IS REAL: MORE “FAKE NEWS” OF A TRADE SECRET
EXCEPTION, COUNTERED BY SOME “REAL NEWS” ENLIGHTENMENT
The threat elucidated by this Article is real. There is a long line of
recent cases referring to the (non-existent) trade secret exception to BPC
section 16600.95 Whether by careless error, or perhaps nefarious
intentions propagated by those seeking to unlawfully create restraints in
violation of BPC section 16600, the careless dictum from Muggill
continues to cast a dark penumbra over the clear statutory protections of
BPC section 16600.
Barely a month and a half following the decision in Edwards,96 in
Bank of America, N.A. v. Lee,97 a federal district court, applying
California law,98 stated: “The court concludes that [a] ‘trade secret
exception’ to §16600 still applies.”99 Notwithstanding a citation to
Edwards, which clearly stood for a contrary proposition,100 the Bank of
America court went so far as to conclude that “the ‘trade secret
exception’ to §16600 remains intact.”101 How can something that never
existed and emerged only as a figment through dictum be cited as
superseding a clear statute? Indeed, a little dictum is a dangerous thing.

95. See, e.g., Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Tarantino, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1169 (N.D.
Cal. 2020) (The Edwards “ . . . court declined to ‘address the applicability of the so-called
trade secret exception to section 16600.’ Post-Edwards, there is not a clear consensus as to
whether there is such an exception to § 16600 . . . .” (citation omitted)); DePuy Synthes Sales,
Inc. v. Stryker Corp., No. ED CV 18-1557 FMO (KKx), 2020 WL 6205702, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 29, 2020) (“However, this ‘trade secret exception,’ if it still exists, is narrow.”) (citation
omitted); Sandler Partners, LLC v. Masergy Communications, Inc., No. CV 19-6841JFW(MAAx), 2019 WL 9047103, at *7 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (“In addition, California
courts have recognized a trade secret exception to § 16600.”); Int’l Petroleum Prods. &
Additives Co. v. Black Gold, S.A.R.L., 418 F. Supp. 3d 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Section
16660 provides, in relevant part, that ‘every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.’
California courts, however, have repeatedly recognized an ‘exception’ to the rule where trade
secret information may be used to redirect business away from one business to another.”);
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lee, No. CV 08–5546 CAS(JWJx), 2008 WL 4351348, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (“The court concludes that ‘trade secret exception’ to § 16600 still applies.”).
96. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008).
97. Bank of Am., N.A., 2008 WL 4351348, at *6.
98. “[A] federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction over a case that does not involve
a federal question must apply the substantive law of the state where the court sits.” Erie
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
99. Bank of Am., N.A., 2008 WL 4351348, at *6.
100. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
101. Bank of Am., N.A., 2008 WL 4351348, at *6.
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In the 2014 case of Global Trim Sales,102 another federal court
applying California state law,103 declared that it embraced restraints in
violation of BPC section 16600 under the auspices of a trade secret
exception: “Regardless of the theory of enforcement, noncompete . . .
clauses will be upheld under California law if they are ‘narrowly tailored
or carefully limited to the protection of trade secrets.’ ” 104 The language
quoted by the federal court in Global Trim Sales in support of its
proposition of a trade secret exception comes from a California state
appeals court opinion; however, the California state appeals court
opinion did not even support such a proposition. The federal court went
blithely astray on its assertion of a trade secret exception because the
language quoted by the court was a partial excerpt of a sentence, deftly
and surgically sliced out of context. Indeed, had the federal court merely
quoted the remainder of the exact same paragraph from the state appeals
court opinion, it would have correctly reached the polar opposite
conclusion and expelled any “trade secret exception.” The same
paragraph from the state appeals court opinion declares: “we doubt the
continued viability of the common law trade secret exception to
covenants not to compete . . . . Even assuming the exception exists, we
agree with the trial court that it has no application here.”105 The state
appeals court demonstrated enlightenment; however, the federal court in
Global Trim Sales completely omitted this critical, relevant, and
necessary text. Other courts, like the federal court in Global Trim Sales,
have also myopically repeated the big lie of a so-called trade secret
exception.106
Despite the plethora of cases perpetuating the myth, there are well
reasoned decisions, post Edwards, pointing to clear precedential weight
against the existence of any such beast cloaked as a trade secret
exception. A notable example is Retirement Group v. Galante,107 where
102. Glob. Trim Sales, Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys. UK Ltd., No. SACV 12-1314-JLS (RNBx),
2014 WL 12690629, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014).
103. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008).
104. Glob. Trim Sales, 2014 WL 12690629, at *5.
105. Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(emphasis added).
106. See sources cited supra note 95.
107. Retirement Group v. Galante, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see also
Dowell, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 10-11 (“In reconciling the ‘tension’ between section 16600 and
trade secrets, the Galante court stated: ‘We distill from the foregoing cases that section 16600
bars a court from specifically enforcing (by way of injunctive relief) a contractual clause
purporting to ban a former employee from soliciting former customers to transfer their
business away from the former employer to the employee’s new business, but a court may
enjoin tortious conduct (as violative of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ. Code, §
3426 et seq.) and/or the unfair competition law) by banning the former employee from using
trade secret information to identify existing customers, to facilitate the solicitation of such
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the court evaluated an investment advisor attempting to restrain former
employees from use of customer lists, characterized as trade secrets, as
well as from soliciting customers. In its determination regarding the
scope of an injunction, the court carefully and separately evaluated the
issues of protecting trade secrets (customer lists) and soliciting
customers.108 The court shrewdly wrote that, “we have already
concluded it is not the solicitation of the customers, but is instead the
unfair competition or misuse of trade secret information, that may be
enjoined.”109 Inherent in this determination is a clear message that an
injunction may prohibit use of clearly delineated and specific
confidential information/trade secrets, but cannot restrain an individual
from practicing a profession, trade or business or engaging in activities
which do not use or rely upon such clearly and specifically delineated
confidential information/trade secrets. This is exactly the proposition
that Gordon stood for. Therefore, a priori, development of new
customer lists or creation of an invention without use of or reliance upon
delineated confidential information cannot be enjoined.110
customers, or to otherwise unfairly compete with the former employer. Viewed in this light,
therefore, the conduct is enjoinable not because it falls within a judicially created ‘exception’
to section 16600’s ban on contractual nonsolicitation clauses, but is instead enjoinable because
it is wrongful independent of any contractual undertaking.’ ” ).
108. Retirement Group, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 592-96.
109. Id. at 595.
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.) (emphasis added):
(d) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
The customary language in non-disclosure/confidentiality agreements to protect trade
secrets recognizes that protection cannot extend to information that is independently created
without use of, or reliance upon, the underlying confidential information. Otherwise, the
asserted ownership of the original confidential information would be a fiction, not subject to
protection under CALUTSA. Id. See generally FACEBOOK, POTENTIAL EMPLOYEE
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT § 2 (2006), https://foxrothschild.gjassets.com/content/uploads
/2017/03/Trade-Secret-Protection-and-Cybersecurity-Risks.pdf (stating that the restrictions
of confidentiality do not apply to any information that “is independently developed by
Applicant without reference to information disclosed by any Facebook Party”); ASS’N OF
INDEP. COMMERCIAL PRODUCERS, MUTUAL NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT § 2 (n.d.),
https://www.aicp.com/assets/editor/AICPNDAmutual080218_FINAL.pdf (“The obligations
of confidentiality in this Agreement do not extend to any item of Confidential Information
which . . . (iv) was generated independently by the receiving Recipient without reliance on or
use of the Discloser’s Confidential Information (as proven by supporting documentation
evidencing such independent generation).”); NAT’L GRID, NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT §
3, at 3 (n.d.), https://www.nationalgridus.com/media/pdfs/bulk-energy-storage-request-for-
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In 2018, the same enlightened California reiterated the concept,
stating:
This court in Galante recognized the “tension” between section
16600 and trade secrets, but nonetheless found that section 16600
barred a court from “specifically enforcing . . . a contractual clause
purporting to ban a former employee from soliciting former
customers to transfer their business away from the former employer
to the employee’s new business, but a court may enjoin . . . the
former employee from using trade secret information to identify
existing customers, to facilitate the solicitation of such customers, or
to otherwise unfairly compete with the former employer.”111

The critical element here is that a former employee may engage in
competing activities and business, as long as the information used in
doing so is independently developed, derived, or conceived without use
of, or reliance upon, confidential information or trade secrets of the
former employer.112
In the 2016 opinion of Artec Group, Inc. v. Klimov,113 the
enlightened court spotted the loud and clear message from Edwards and
other precedent, stating:
The Court, however, is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s contention that
the provision at issue in this case is enforceable under the “trade
secrets” exception to section 16600 . . . . As an initial matter, the
California Supreme Court’s Edwards decision called into doubt the
continued viability of the [trade secret exception]: “We do not here
address the applicability of the so-called trade secret exception
to section 16600.” In any event, the Court need not address the
continued viability of the exception because the provision at issue in
the instant case would apply to all products “similar to or competitive
with” Artec products, regardless of whether the products involve

proposals/appendix-g-nda-form.pdf (“This Non-Disclosure Agreement shall not apply to
Information that . . . (iv) is developed by Recipient or its Representatives independently of the
Information disclosed hereunder by or on behalf of Disclosing Party (as evidenced by written
documentation).”); LASER SPINE INST., CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE
AGREEMENT § 3, at 3 (2019), https://lsi-assignee.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/
Confidentiality-and-Non-Disclosure-Agreement-LSI-ABC.pdf (stating that confidential
information does not include information that “can be shown by written documentation to
have been independently developed by the Receiving Party without use of or reliance upon
any Confidential Information or Confidential Materials of the Disclosing Party”).
111. AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 591
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
112. Id.; see also supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
113. Artec Grp. Inc. v. Klimov, No. 15-cv-03349-EMC, 2016 WL 7157635 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 8, 2016).
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protected or confidential information, and the agreement contains
separate provisions to address confidential information.114

Artec demonstrated sound reasoning in identifying the precarious
lineage of a trade secret exception, and also signaled that any protection
of a trade secret must be limited to actual use of specifically delineated
confidential information, or else such restraint exceeds the permissible
boundaries of BPC section 16600.115
In the 2020 case of Power Integrations,116 a federal court applying
state law117 also saw the light. The court refused to extend
nonsolicitation and noncompetition clauses beyond protection of clearly
delineated trade secrets.118 The court stated: “[T]his Court declines to
find that a trade secret exception to §16600 exists to the extent that
Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract cause of action. The nonsolicitation
and noncompetition clauses are unenforceable under §16600 and overly
broad.”119 The court also acknowledged the clear guidance of the
California Supreme Court in interpreting BPC section 16600, noting that
“section 16600 prohibits employee noncompetition agreements unless
the agreement falls within a statutory exception.”120 Similarly, in Green
Payment Solutions,121 the federal court turned to the clear language of
BPC section 16600, stating that: “There are three statutory exceptions to
§16600, none of which applies here. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§16601, 16602, 1660.5 (creating statutory exceptions for the sale or
dissolution of a partnership, limited liability company, or the sale of a
business’s goodwill).”122
VII. CONCLUSION: PUTTING KNOWLEDGE INTO PRACTICE
Having carefully evaluated the loose dictum from Muggill, and how
it misrepresented the decision in Gordon, it is amazing that the myth of
a trade secret exception to BPC section 16600 even started, let alone how
it has survived for over half a century. How can one take this knowledge
114. Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
115. Id. (“In any event, the Court need not address the continued viability of the exception
because the provision at issue in the instant case would apply to all products ‘similar to or
competitive with’ Artec products, regardless of whether the products involve protected or
confidential information . . . .”).
116. Power Integrations, Inc. v. De Lara, No. 20-cv-410-MMA (MSB), 2020 WL
1467406 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020).
117. See supra note 98.
118. Power Integrations, Inc., 2020 WL 1467406, at *12-14.
119. Id. at *14.
120. Id. (citing Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008)).
121. Green Payment Solutions, LLC v. First Data Merch. Servs. Corp., No. CV 18-1463
DSF (ASx), 2019 WL 4570015, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019).
122. Id.

2022]

A LITTLE DICTUM IS A DANGEROUS THING

267

and avoid creating unenforceable contracts of restraint, as well as avoid
creating potential employer tort liability?123 Based upon the analysis
above, there are four key points:
A. There is no trade secret exception to BPC section 16600;124
B. An employer may not restrain a former employee from working
for a competitor or engaging in a competing business enterprise,
regardless of whether the former employee has or had access to trade
secrets;125
C. An employer may not restrain a former employee from
cultivating or developing information if this activity is performed
without use of or reliance upon the employer’s trade secrets, regardless
of whether the former employee had access to the employer’s trade
secrets;126 and

123. See Edwards, 189 P.3d, at 290 (“In order to prove a claim for intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff has the burden of proving five elements: (1)
an economic relationship between plaintiff and a third party, with the probability of future
economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) an
intentional act by the defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of
the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant’s
wrongful act, including an intentional act by the defendant that is designed to disrupt the
relationship between the plaintiff and a third party.”); Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 517
(Cal. 2004) (“May the tort of interference with contractual relations be predicated upon
interference with an at-will contract? Historically, the answer is yes. A third party’s
‘interference with an at-will contract is actionable interference with the contractual
relationship’ because the contractual relationship is at the will of the parties, not at the will of
outsiders. More specifically, may such tort be based on interference with an at-will
employment relationship? Again, historically, the answer is yes.” (citations omitted)). See
generally Graves, supra note 16, at 11.
124. See supra notes 40-94 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. See generally D’Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 497-98 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000). The subject non-disclosure agreement was determined to be unenforceable with regard
to its goal of restraining future employment related to the same or similar products (rather
than merely restricting use of delineated trade secrets), and provided:
Employee will not render services, directly or indirectly, for a period of one year
after separation of employment with Playhut, Inc. to any person or entity in
connection with any Competing Product. A ‘Competing Product’ shall mean any
products, processes or services of any person or entity other than Playhut, Inc. in
existence or under development, which are substantially the same, may be
substituted for, or applied to substantially that same end use as the products,
processes or services with which I work during the time of my employment with
Playhut, Inc. or about which I work during the time of my employment with Playhut,
Inc. or about which I acquire Confidential Information through my work with
Playhut, Inc. Employee agrees that, upon accepting employment with any
organization in competition with the Company or its affiliates during a period of
five year(s) following employment separation, Employee shall notify the Company
in writing within thirty days of the name and address of such new employer.
Id.
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D. An injunction to prevent misappropriation of protected trade
secrets under CALUTSA can only extend to prevent use of the specific
information constituting such trade secrets and cannot restrain a former
employee from engaging in competitive activities, or from developing
information (including something similar to the original trade secrets) as
long as done without use of or reliance upon the original confidential
information.127
While Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 does not constrain a court in
equity from fashioning an appropriate remedy focused on the
misappropriation of trade secrets, . . . a court should be highly
cognizant of the important policies embodied in Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 16600 when crafting an injunction.128

Fear that an employee will be unable to compartmentalize
information with a result of inevitable disclosure129 does not satisfy the
legal requirements to justify an injunction under CALUTSA,130 and any
127. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
128. Pyro Spectaculars N., Inc. v. Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
(emphasis added).
129. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. The author has previously
characterized inevitable disclosure as “guilty until proven guilty” (or “liable until proven
liable” in the civil law context). See Anderson, supra note 1, at 32; see also Elizabeth A.
Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167 (2005). See generally David Lincicum, Note,
Inevitable Conflict?: California’s Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of “Inevitable
Disclosure,” 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1257 (2002).
130. See generally Retirement Grp. v. Galante, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 593 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (“We distill from the foregoing cases that §16600 bars a court from specifically
enforcing (by way of injunctive relief) a contractual clause purporting to ban a former
employee from soliciting former customers to transfer their business away from the former
employer to the employee’s new business, but a court may enjoin tortious conduct (as
violative of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and/or the Unfair Competition Law) by
banning the former employee from using trade secret information to identify existing
customers, to facilitate the solicitation of such customers . . . . Viewed in this light, therefore,
the conduct is enjoinable not because it falls within a judicially-created [trade secret]
‘exception’ to section 16600’s ban on contractual nonsolicitation clauses, but is instead
enjoinable because it is wrongful independent of [the contractual undertaking of
confidentiality related to the trade secret] . . . .”); Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 1, 10-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“In reconciling the ‘tension’ between section 16600
and trade secrets, the Galante court stated: ‘We distill from the foregoing cases that section
16600 bars a court from specifically enforcing (by way of injunctive relief) a contractual
clause purporting to ban a former employee from soliciting former customers to transfer their
business away from the former employer to the employee’s new business, but a court may
enjoin tortious conduct (as violative of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ. Code,
§3426 et seq.) and/or the unfair competition law) by banning the former employee from using
trade secret information to identify existing customers, to facilitate the solicitation of such
customers, or to otherwise unfairly compete with the former employer. Viewed in this light,
therefore, the conduct is enjoinable not because it falls within a judicially created ‘exception’
to section 16600’s ban on contractual nonsolicitation clauses, but is instead enjoinable because
it is wrongful independent of any contractual undertaking.’ ” ).
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That said, there remains a carefully restricted and limited right
under CALUTSA to only prevent a former employee from using trade

131. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
(“The doctrine of inevitable disclosure permits a trade secret owner to prevent a former
employee from working for a competitor despite the owner’s failure to prove the employee
has taken or threatens to use trade secrets. Under that doctrine, the employee may be enjoined
by demonstrating the employee’s new job duties will inevitably cause the employee to rely
upon knowledge of the former employer’s trade secrets. No published California decision has
accepted or rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine. In this opinion, we reject the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. We hold this doctrine is contrary to California law and policy because it
creates an after-the-fact covenant not to compete restricting employee mobility.”); Cypress
Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Prod., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 486, 504–05 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2015) (“Nothing in the complaint, and nothing submitted by Cypress since filing the
complaint, lends any color to the naked assertion that Maxim was pursuing Cypress
employees with the object of extracting trade secrets from them. In the trial court Maxim
suggested that Cypress’s claims in this regard implicitly rested on the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure, under which some jurisdictions will permit a plaintiff to substantiate a trade secret
claim against a departing employee ‘by demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment
will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.’ This doctrine, as Maxim
pointed out, has been flatly rejected in this state as incompatible with the strong public policy
in favor of employee mobility. The inevitable disclosure doctrine would contravene this policy
by ‘permit[ting] an employer to enjoin the former employee without proof of the employee’s
actual or threatened use of trade secrets based upon an inference (based in turn upon
circumstantial evidence) that the employee inevitably will use his or her knowledge of those
trade secrets in the new employment. The result is not merely an injunction against the use of
trade secrets, but an injunction restricting employment.’ Cypress expressly disclaimed any
reliance on the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, but in the absence of that doctrine we can
detect no basis for its allegation of threatened misappropriation. . . . Given the complete
absence of any coherent factual allegations suggesting a threatened misappropriation,
Cypress’s second theory of relief was an inevitable disclosure claim, or it was no claim at
all—and in either case, it did not state grounds for relief under California law.” (citations
omitted)); Hooked Media Grp., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 413–14 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2020), review granted and cause transferred sub nom. Hooked Media Grp. v. Apple,
472 P.3d 1064 (Cal. 2020) (“Hooked relies on circumstantial evidence that in its view
generates an inference of trade secret use sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to that
element: its former employees were assigned to tasks at Apple similar to the work they did at
Hooked and within weeks one of them produced a detailed plan for a recommendations system
much like Hooked’s version. Further, an expert opined that the source code for Apple’s
recommendations system was similar to the source code for Hooked’s. That evidence does
suggest the engineers drew on knowledge and skills they gained from Hooked to develop a
product for their new employer––but California’s policy favoring free mobility for employees
specifically allows that. Allowing an action for trade secret misappropriation against a former
employee for using his or her own knowledge to benefit a new employer is impermissible
because it would be equivalent to retroactively imposing on the employee a covenant not to
compete. For that reason, evidence that Apple hired engineers with knowledge of Hooked’s
trade secrets and that the engineers inevitably would have relied on that knowledge in their
work for Apple does not support a claim for improper acquisition of a trade secret. Hooked
did not meet its burden to show a triable issue of material fact.” (citations omitted)).
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secrets.132 It does not prevent competition by the former employee,
either directly or through a new employer. Any confidentiality
agreement, or injunction, must not traverse into the sacred house of BPC
section 16600, by attempting to restrain such former employee from
competing with the former employer, or soliciting customers, as long as
the former employee does so without use of, or reliance upon,
confidential information or trade secrets.133 Let’s consider some
examples of unenforceable restraints:
SAMPLE A: “Employee agrees that the customer lists of Employer
are confidential and constitute trade secrets (Proprietary Customer
Lists), and Employee agrees to not remove or use such Proprietary
Customer Lists in any way upon separation from Employer, and further
agrees not to solicit any customers on such Proprietary Customer Lists
following separation from Employer.”
Why is it unenforceable? The Employee and/or new employer
could independently develop customer lists without use of, or reliance
upon, the Proprietary Customer Lists. For example, the Employee might
develop a list of customers from researching a database, or from
information or leads developed by the new employer, without use of the
Proprietary Customer Lists. Obviously, the (former) Employee, as well
as new employer, would be well served from an evidentiary and liability
perspective by maintaining a document trail clearly demonstrating that
the new customer lists were generated without use of, or reliance upon,
the trade secrets of the former Employer.
SAMPLE B: “Employee is assigned to develop a radio frequency
transmitter circuit (Project) for Employer and will have access to
confidential and proprietary information in this project. Upon separation
from Employer, Employee agrees for a period of six months to not work
upon anything similar to the Project for any other person or entity.”
Why is this unenforceable? The attempted restraint has absolutely
no connection to the Employer’s trade secrets. Instead, it attempts to
restrain the Employee from a lawful trade, profession, or occupation.
Additionally, the time limit of restriction adds nothing to enforceability,
because BPC section 16600 is not contingent upon short time limits or
narrow restraints.134

132. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.1 - 3426.3 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
133. See supra note 122.
134. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008); see also Bradford
P. Anderson, Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP: There is Not a “Narrow-Restraint” Exception
to California’s Prohibition of Noncompetition Agreements, and a General Release May Not
Mean What It Says, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 163 (2009).
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In both of the examples above, the sample provisions fail the
enforceability litmus test because they seek to venture beyond trade
secret protection, into the land of restraint violative of BPC section
16600, as well as beyond the scope of protection of any trade secrets
under CALUTSA.
An enforceable provision would have the following traits:
A. There would be an underlying confidentiality agreement limited
to information of the employer that is proprietary, and derives actual or
potential economic value through not being generally known to the
public or others (“Proprietary Information”);135 and
B. Any restriction placed upon the employee would be limited to a
prohibition against use of, or reliance upon the Proprietary Information.
For example, the employee could be prohibited from using the
Proprietary Information for development of customer lists/profiles or
using the Proprietary Information to create a new invention or device.
C. Any restriction placed upon the employee would not attempt to
prevent the employee from engaging in the same or similar line of work
for another employer, or from developing new inventions or devices
(even if they are similar to the work performed for the former employer),
as long as doing so does not involve the use of, or reliance upon, the
Proprietary Information.
Of course, in a battle over preventing a specifically delineated trade
secret from being used, versus an attempt by a former employer to
restrain a former employee from engaging in the same or similar
business in violation of BPC section 16600, both the former employee
and the new employer would be extremely well served to have clear
documentation (e.g., research materials, lab books, and the like)
demonstrating independent development, free of any use of or reliance
upon the former employer’s proprietary information.
No doubt, there will come a day when a judicial showdown occurs
on the mythical trade secret exception. This myth came to life out of
dangerous little dictum. As demonstrated above, we can already portend
the outcome of such a battle. The showdown will undoubtedly finally
cast a death knell to the myth.

135. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).

